The weakness here is that, given the specificity of the situation analyzed in the article, the conclusions are not nearly as broadly applicable as the author seems to imply. Doubtless the conclusions can be related to other events to some degree, but the author himself acknowledges that a lack of experts on Somalia was instrumental in the ultimate failure of the intervention, and other countries would require other experts and different proposed solutions. Still, the author is quite successful in developing his theory through direct analysis of what key players and documents actually said regarding the issue, basing his theory firmly in facts and drawing conclusions based on effects rather than on theoretical principles. Along the same line, the research methods that the author employs and his evidence...

His citing of Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador in Nairobi, as well as other key officials involved in the Somali intervention, allows for the development of a clear and definitive picture of the political considerations -- or more precisely, the lack thereof -- that led to the specific failures of the chosen intervention plan. This article will definitely assist in learning more about International Relations as a whole, as it is written in immensely clear language that both defines and applies theory without using grand and often inapplicable principles, but rather utilizes concrete details that are imminently observable in order to extract and develop theory, working from the ground up rather than from the top down, as it were.